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CORPORATE MORALITY AND MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS
In response to a perceived opportunity for corporate management to share
in the success of their companies,' management groups have been increasingly
active in acquiring ownership of public companies through the use of manage-
ment buyout transactions.' A management buyout transaction is any process
by which the management of a public corporation acquires enough of the cor-
poration's outstanding shares to convert the formerly public corporation into
a private company. 3 By using the corporation's assets as collateral for loans
to finance the buyout, corporate management alone or with other investors
can leverage" a buyout of the corporation without risking substantial personal
assets.5 Leveraged buyouts, therefore, are particularly attractive to manage-
ment as a technique for acquiring significant equity interests in the companies
for which they labor.6 In addition to providing management with an attrac-
tive method of acquiring corporate ownership, management buyouts frequently
result in gains in corporate performance by creating greater incentives for
1. See Why Leveraged Buyouts are Getting So Hot, Businessweek, June 27, 1983, at 86
[hereinafter cited as Getting Hot] (prospect of spectacular returns prompts management buyout
attempts); Wantuck, When Managers Become Owners, Nation's Business, August, 1983, at 60
(prospect of quick returns to investors is prime attraction of leveraged buyouts).
2. See Private Lives, Time, June 20, 1983, at 62 [hereinafter cited as Private Lives] (going
private transactions are increasing in popularity). According to W.T. Grimm & Co., a Chicago
merger and acquisition consultant, management buyouts increased from 47 in 1980 to' 115 in
1982. See Getting Hot, supra note 1, at 86; see also Longstreth, Fairness of Management Buyouts
Needs Evaluation, Legal Times, October 10, 1983, at 15, col. 3 (at least 169 management buyouts
occurred in 1983).
3. See Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganizations, 71 CAiw. L. Rnv. 1073, 1091 (1983) (management buyout is process for eliminating
corporation's public shareholders). The term management buyout may also include situations
in which the management of a subsidiary company purchases the subsidiary from the parent
corporation. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. 2. This article will not address subsidiary
management buyouts, however, because subsidiary buyout transactions do not directly involve
public shareholders and raise different financial concerns. See generally Gupta, The Alchemists
of Public Buyouts, Venture, October, 1983, at 50 (discussing benefits of subsidiary buyout
transactions).
4. See W. KLnN, BusmNSS ORAxizAnToN AN FiNAN E 221 (1980) (leverage occurs when
investor finances investment by borrowing from other investors); Private Lives, supra note 2,
at 62 (leveraged buyout maneuver involves purchasing company with loans which company's assets
secure).
5. See Wantuck, supra note I, at 60 (investors in leveraged buyout put in small amount
of cash and borrow rest of purchase price against company assets); Hill & Williams, Buyout
Boom, Wall St. J., December 29, 1983, at 6, col. 2 (buyers in leveraged buyouts do not have
to contribute much personal equity because of company's large borrowings).
6. See Ross, How The Champs Do Leveraged Buyouts, Fortune, January 23, 1984, at
70 (top managers receive significant equity interests in buyout transactions); Brody, Controversil
Issue: A Leveraged Buyout Touches Off A Bitter Dispute, Barrons, September 19, 1983, at 15
(company's future profits motivate managerial interest in buyout transactions); Getting Hot, supra
note 1, at 86 (management buyout provides opportunity for managers to acquire equity interests
in company).
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managers and benefit a corporation's shareholders by offering a premium for
publicly held shares. 7 Despite the benefits of management buyouts for manage-
ment and public shareholders, critics of management buyout transactions have
raised serious questions concerning the propriety of the management buyout
process.'
Critics of management buyouts contend that management buyout trans-
actions violate the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934's ('34 Act)9 prohibi-
tions against insider trading ° and otherwise provide management an unfair
informational advantage in purchasing public companies."I Insider trading oc-
curs when an individual or group of individuals trade for personal gain on
the basis of confidential corporate information to which the corporation
possesses an exclusive right.' 2 Critics of management buyouts assert that
management's ability to bid against outside investors for the corporation at
which managers hold positions is an exploitation of inside information because
management has access to information concerning the value and future earn-
ings of public companies not available to the general public.13 The charge of
insider trading becomes more egregious when the management group owns
a controlling block of corporate shares prior to a buyout transaction and can
unilaterally set the price which outside investors will receive for minority
shares.'
4
7. See De Angelo & De Angelo, The Numbers Show Everyone Profits, N.Y. Times, Jan.
22, 1984, at D-2, col. 2 (shareholders generally receive significant premium above market prices
in management buyout transaction); Hill & Williams, supra note 5, at 6, col. 2 (leveraged buyout
permits buyers to offer premium to public shareholders); infra notes 52-57 and accompanying
text (private ownership creates incentive for managers to increase corporate performance), 174
and accompanying text (premiums in management buyouts are equivalent to premiums that
shareholders receive in public tender offers).
8. See infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text (management buyouts raise questions con-
cerning insider trading and management's fiduciary duty to public shareholders).
9. See 15 U.S.C. 78 (1976) (Securities & Exchange Act of 1934).
10. See id. § 78p(b) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits corporate insiders from
using corporate information for personal gain). An insider is a director or officer of a company
whose equity securities are registered on a national securities exchange. Id. Inside information
is advance information which is not generally available to public shareholders. See Rheem Mfg.
Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1961) (insider trading is breach of fiduciary duty
to company); infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (management enjoys insider advantage
in valuing companies at which management holds positions).
11. See Hetherington, When The Sleeper Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance
and Shareholder Rights, 8 HoFsRA L. Ray. 183, 235 (1979) (management's access to more com-
plete and accurate corporate information renders management less likely to err in valuing shares);
Thomas, A Free Ride for Management Insiders, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, at D2, col. 1 (figures
that represent corporatin's real value and earnings are in management's exclusive possession).
12. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 828 (2d Cir. 1971) (corporate officers and
directors may not use confidential corporate information for personal gain); infra notes 13-14
and accompanying text (allegations of insider trading apply to management buyout transactions).
13. See Brudney, supra note 3, at 1095 (access to information concerning firm's improving
prospects induces management to take company private); Thomas, supra note 11, at D2, col.
4 (management exploits confidential corporate information in displacing public shareholders for
personal gain).
14. See Address by Commissioner A.A. Sommer Jr., "Going Private": A Lesson in Cor-
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Additionally, management buyout transactions may violate management's
fiduciary obligation to administer corporate affairs for the exclusive benefit
of the corporation and the corporation's shareholders. 5 At common law, cor-
porate officers and directors owed a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corpora-
tion and the corporation's shareholders to act in the best interests of the com-
pany as opposed to the personal interests of management. 6 Management's
fiduciary duty, therefore, requires that management conduct corporate affairs
in the best interests of every shareholder.II Management buyout transactions,
however, undermine management's undivided loyalty to the corporation by
placing management as an interested party on both sides of the sale and repur-
chase transaction.'" Even when going private is in the best interests of a cor-
porate Responsibility, at The Notre Dame Law School, November, 1974, reprinted in SEC. REo.
& L. REP. (BNA), No. 278, § D, at 3-4 (attacking morality of process by which managers take
companies private); infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (procedures by which management
may divest company of public shareholders).
15. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 137-38 (1972) (majority shareholders and
corporate directors owe fiduciary duty to all shareholders not to misuse power by promoting
personal interests); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304, 312 (1949) (courts must
apply to corporate fiduciaries standard of loyalty that will prevent conflict of interest from aris-
ing); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) (Court insists on scrupulous observance
of management's fiduciary obligations). State law generally governs the fiduciary obligations of
corporate officers. See Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 1969) (state
law determines fiduciary obligations within corporations); Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696,
702-03 (2nd Cir.) (court refers to laws of state of incorporation to determine fiduciary obliga-
tions), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962). States have construed strictly statutes mandating manage-
ment's fiduciary duty to the corporation and the corporation's shareholders. See, e.g., Herald
Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972) (corporate officers under Colorado law
function as agents of corporation and thereby occupy quasi-fiduciary relation to shareholders);
Talbot v. James, 190 S.E.2d 759, 764 (S.C. 1972) (officers of corporation stand in fiduciary
relationship to shareholders); Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 845, -, 472 P.2d 589, 593-94
(1970) (fiduciary duty of corporate officers requires utmost good faith and undivided loyalty
to corporation and every shareholder). Some states have therefore codified the duties and obliga-
tions of corporate officers. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 10-2A-76 (1980) (nothing shall impair or modify
the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors, officers, and controlling shareholders); N.Y. Bus.
Coii. LAw § 717 (1977) (corporate officers and directors shall discharge duties in good faith
with degree of diligence which prudent men would exercise in similar circumstances and like posi-
tions); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Pruden 1968) (officers and directors stand in fiduciary
relation to corporation).
16. See A. BEPUL & G. MEANS, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 196-98 (rev.
ed. 1968) (common law imposed fiduciary obligation on management to ensure that separation
of ownership from management in public companies did not allow management to exploit cor-
porate assets for personal gain).
17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (corporate officers and directors owe fiduciary
duty to corporation and corporation's shareholders).
18. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939) (fiduciary may not utilize corporate
entity to violate ancient precept against serving two masters); 2 A. ScoTr, THEn LAW OF TRUSTS
1298 (3rd ed. 1967) (trustee violates fiduciary duty if he uses his position to influence beneficiary
to acquiesce in trustees' purchase of trust assets); Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort
or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987, 1017-18 (1974) (going private is kind of ultimate conflict-
of-interest transaction); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 914 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Going Private] (management's power of coercion during buyout transaction conflicts with
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poration's public shareholders, management's dual role as buyer and seller
is suspect because management's interest in acquiring the corporation for the
lowest possible price conflicts with management's duty to obtain the highest
possible price for public shareholders.' 9 Moreover, management's conflict of
interest is especially clear when management can unilaterally determine the
sale and repurchase price.
20
Management often can unilaterally set the price that shareholders will
receive for the corporation's shares in buyout transactions by employing one
or a combination of several going private techniques. 21 One going private tech-
nique which is particularly useful when management possesses a controlling
block of corporate shares prior to a buyout transaction is the one-step merger.
22
The one-step merger, permitted in all states,23 allows a controlling group of
shareholders to transfer corporate shares to a newly formed shell corporation
wholly pwned by the controlling group.24 When management does not possess
management's fiduciary duty to public shareholders). In questioning the propriety of manage-
ment buyouts, critics assert that management's purchase of corporate assets potentially compromises
management's duty to public shareholders. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. 3-4 (manage-
ment buyouts present self-dealing problems).
19. See Brudney, A Note On Going Private, 61 VA. L. Rnv. 1019, 1029-30 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Note On Going Private] (going private provides fiduciaries classic temptation for self-
dealing); Sommer, supra note 14, at D-4 (management buyouts present clear conflict of interests).
20. See Sommer, supra note 14, at D 3-4 (management uses cash merger statutes to divest
minority shareholders at price which management sets in merger agreement).
21. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. 1-2 (management may unilaterally determine
price shareholders will receive for minority shares during buyout transaction in certain cir-
cumstances); infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (commonly used techniques for taking
companies private).
22. See Note On Going Private, supra note 19, at 1021-22 (discussing use of one-step merger
to force minority shareholders out of company); Going Private, supra note 18, at 909-10 (ex-
amining one-step merger involving Barbara Lynn Stores).
23. See 8 Z. CAvrrCH, BusiNEss ORANiznrroNs Wrn TAx PLANrNIN § 166.01, at 166-2
(1983) (all states give business corporations power to merge or consolidate); see, e.g., ALAsKA
STAT. § 10.05.390 (1968) (corporations may merge upon the affirmative votes of two-thirds of
all shares of all corporations involved in merger transaction); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c)
(1983) (statutory merger requires favorable vote of majority of outstanding shares of both cor-
porations seeking to merge); Ky. Rnv. STATE § 271A. 365(2) (1972) (majority of outstanding
shares of both corporations intending to merge must vote in favor of merger agreement to con-
summate merger transaction). In addition to state statutory merger procedures that require the
approval of shareholders of the merging companies, all but a few states provide parent corpora-
tions owning a requisite percentage of subsidiary corporate shares a short form merger procedure
for merging the subsidiary corporation into the parent without the approval of either of the merging
companys' shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (1983) (parent company may
effect short-form merger of subsidiary company if parent company owns 90% of subsidiary's
outstanding shares); MD. CoRps. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-106(a), (c) (1976) (parent corporations
may merge 90% owned subsidiary companies without shareholder approval); VA. CODE § 13.1-76
(1975) (any corporation owning 90%o of outstanding shares of another corporation may merge
subsidiary corporation into itself without approval of either corporation's shareholders). But see
infra note 28 and accompanying text (not all states allow acquiring companies to divest minority
shareholders of acquired company with cash payment as opposed to security interests in surviving
company).
24. See Sommer, supra note 14, at D-3 (controlling shareholders may transfer controlling
block of corporate shares to newly formed corporation which controlling group wholly owns).
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a controlling block of corporate shares prior to a buyout transaction, manage-
ment may conduct a two-step merger transaction.2 5 In a two-step merger,
management makes a tender offer for a controlling block of the corporation's
shares and then transfers those shares to a management-owned shell
corporation."6 Pursuant to both the one-step and two-step merger techniques,
management next causes the wholly owned shell corporation to merge with
the original corporation leaving the shell corporation as the surviving or ac-
quiring company. 2 Management finally completes the one or two-step merger
by forcing minority shareholders to receive cash in place of shares in the ac-
quired company in accordance with cash merger statutes which in leading com-
mercial states permit acquiring companies to compel acquired company
shareholders to relinquish their shares in exchange for cash.28 The merger thus
25. See Hetherington, supra note 11, at 233 (first stage of going private transaction is often
tender offer for publicly held shares); Going Private, supra note 18, at 910 (tender offers do
not require shareholder approval); infra note 26 and accompanying text (tender offer regulation).
26. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596-97 (5th Cir.) (discussing com-
ponents of tender offers), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). A tender offer normally consists
of an offer to purchase all or a portion of a target company's outstanding shares at a premium
price. Id. at 597 n.22. Although a tender offeror will frequently extend an offer to purchase
a company's shares for a limited period of time, the tender offeror normally conditions the premium
offer on receiving favorable responses from a specified number or percentage of the target com-
pany's shareholders. Id. State law generally governs tender offer procedures for corporate ac-
quisitions within the respective state. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1276 to 17-1284 (1974)
(procedures for conducting tender offers in Kansas); N.J. Rav. STAT. § 49:5-1 to 49:5-19 (1977)
(New Jersey statutes regulating tender offer procedures); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 48-2102 to 48-2114
(1976) (Tennessee tender offer provisions). Federal law also governs the conduct of tender offers
through the Williams Act which Congress added to the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act) on July 29, 1968. See Cattlemen's Invest Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D.
Okla. 1972) (Williams Act insures that public investors have truthful information to base invest-
ment decisions upon); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d), (d)(1) (1976) (Williams Act); see also Wolfson, A
Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MI.MI L. Rnv. 959, 978 (1980) (management may pursue goal
of going private through tender offer for minority shares).
27. See Weiss, The Law of Takeout Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv.
624, 624 (1981) (majority shareholders may eliminate minority shares by transferring corporate
shares to newly formed shell corporation and by merging old corporation into shell); Sommer,
supra note 14, at D-2 (typical pattern for buyout transaction involves insiders placing shares in
shell corporation and merging old corporation with shell).
28. See 8 Z. CAvrrcH, supra note 23, § 166.06, at 166-43 (minority shareholders of ac-
quired company may either accept merger price which management establishes in merger agree-
ment or resort to state appraisal remedy); infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text (discussion
of appraisal remedy). In merging the old corporation into the newly formed shell corporation,
however, management must give minority shareholders of the old corporation shares in the sur-
viving corporation rather than cash in a minority of states which restrict the consideration which
management use to displace minority shareholders in merger transactions. See 8 Z. CAVITCH,
supra note 23, § 166.02[l], at 166-9 to -10 (several jurisdictions do not regard cash as good con-
sideration for transfers of shares in merger transactions). See, e.g., CAL. Coa?. CODE § 1101(e)
(1977) (acquiring companies may only convert common shares of acquired companies into
nonredeemable shares of surviving company when acquiring company owns 50% or more of
acquired company prior to merger transaction and does not use short-term merger procedure);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.455 (1983) (directors must specify in merger agreement basis for converting
shares of acquired corporation into shares of surviving corporation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
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results in vesting management with ownership of the newly gone private com-
pany and divesting minority shareholders of ownership in the newly merged
corporation at a price that management has set in the merger agreement."9
One and two-step mergers which displace public shareholders are known as
freezeout or takeout mergers since the mergers enable management to compel
minority shareholders to receive cash instead of an equity interest in the newly
formed corporation. 0 Although freezeout mergers are legal by statute and
court decisions in the states in which most public companies are incorporated, 3
management's proprietary interest in purchasing minority shares conflicts with
management's fiduciary duty to ensure that shareholders receive fair value.
3 2
Management buyouts, therefore, present a conflict between management's duty
to minority shareholders and management's self-interest in acquiring
companies.33
Some critics of management buyouts contend further that fair treatment
of displaced shareholders in going private transactions requires that displaced
shareholders receive a proportionate share of the increased value to the new
company which is attributable to the merger transaction.3 4 Courts have
recognized that corporate acquisitions frequently produce increased value for
§ 1951(b)(3) (1971) (statute requires board of directors of merging corporations to stipulate in
merger agreement basis for converting shares of merging corporations into shares of surviving
corporation).
29. See Sommer, supra note 14, at D-3 (result of buyout transaction is to make controlling
shareholders of old corporation only shareholders of new corporation); Note On Going Private,
supra note 19, at 1020 (insiders become exclusive or predominant owners following process of
forcing out minority shareholders).
30. See Note, Delaware Corporation Law: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.-A Limitation On
Singer Fairness Standards?, 42 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 915, 915 (1981) (majority shareholders force
minority shareholders to receive cash in place of shares in typical freeze-out merger); Brudney
& Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1357 (1978) (essence
of freezeout is majority's displacement of public shareholders for cash or senior securities).
31. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 569 (5th Cir.) (Georgia merger statute
permits majority shareholders to force minority shareholders to accept cash in full payment for
shares), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 263 Pa. Super.
378, 390-92, 398 A.2d 186, 191-92 (1979) (Pennsylvania merger statute permits controlling
shareholders to liquidate minority shareholders at unfairly low prices); David J. Greene & Co.
v. Schenley Indus., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971) (Delaware merger statute permits freezing
out of minority interests); supra note 23 (state statutes which provide business corporations power
to merger and consolidate). But see supra note 28 (a minority of states require that shareholders
of acquired companies receive shares of surviving company as opposed to receiving cash in freezeout
mergers).
32. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv.
L. REv. 297, 298 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fair Shares] (unilateral action by parent corporation
in acquiring minority interests presents classic self-dealing problem).
33. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. 3 (recent transactions prove that manage-
ment's conflict in purchasing public companies warrants legal supervision).
34. See Note On Going Private, supra note 19, at 1025, 1037 (efficiency gains which transpire
from internal rearrangements of corporation during management buyout transactions belong in
part to public shareholders); Fair Shares, supra note 32, at 319-20 (gains attributable to going




public companies because synergistic benefits accrue to acquiring companies. 3-
Synergistic benefits encompass all of the factors which make a company's shares
more valuable to purchasers of an entire company than the shares had been
worth to the company's previous public shareholders. 36 Management buyout
transactions create synergistic benefits for the newly merged corporation by
eliminating SEC filing requirements, 37 increasing earnings prospects, 38 enhanc-
ing corporate productivity,39 and protecting the corporation from future
takeover attempts by outsiders. 40 Although synergistic gains from buyout trans-
actions are often speculative, 4 negotiated arms-length transactions can
automatically account for synergistic post merger gains because public
shareholders are under no compulsion to relinquish their shares in such a
transaction. 4 Shareholders therefore will insist on exacting a premium for
minority shares to reflect a portion of the synergistic benefits which accrue
to the corporation and the corporation's inside shareholders as a result of
the buyout transaction. 43 Involuntary divestments of public shareholders such
as freezeouts mergers, however, may permit management insiders to appropriate
gains at the expense of minority -shareholders because minority shareholders
do not have the opportunity to bargain for fair value among competing
purchasers.4 4 To the extent that legal safeguards are inadequate to ensure that
minority shareholders receive fair value for minority shares in management
buyout transactions, minority shareholders must accept whatever price manage-
ment determines minority shares are worth in the merger agreement.
4
1
35. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1248 (7th Cir.) (merger produces
synergistic effect causing merged corporation to be worth more than sum of merging corpora-
tions), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F.
Supp. 133, 154 n.117 (D. Del. 1975) (court supports idea that acquiring corporations should share
post-merger gains with acquired company shareholders).
36. See Fair Shares, supra note 32, at 323-24 (combined entity after merger may well be
more valuable than sum of merging corporations).
37. See Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44 Fo.DaiAM
L. Rnv. 796, 797 & n.9 (1976) (average corporation on American Stock Exchange can save be-
tween $75,000 and $200,000 in legal and auditing fees by going private).
38. See Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Com-
panies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard? 36 Bus. LAW 1439, 1445 (1981)
(market may apply higher price earnings multiple to company's earnings because company becomes
part of larger enterprise).
39. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (incentive of private ownership results
in greater productivity following buyout transaction).
40. See Chazen, supra note 38, at 1445-46 (going private transactions protect corporation
from being taken over by undesirable party).
41. See Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. Ch. 1977) (virtually impossible
to determine which financial benefits occur solely because of merger).
42. See Chazen, supra note 38, at 1445-46 (shareholder will insist in arm's length negotia-
tion to share in post-merger benefits by receiving premium price for shares).
43. Id.
44. See Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 154 n.117 (D.
Del. 1975) (court acknowledges value of gain-sharing requirement in parent-subsidiary mergers
where arms-length bargaining is impossible).
45. See Brudney, supra note 3, at 1095-98 (difficulty of measuring post-merger gains may
10211984]
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In response to the charge that management buyout transactions are un-
fair to public shareholders because management may appropriate gains at the
expense of public shareholders, proponents of management buyouts contend
that buyouts produce gains sufficiently large to benefit all participants in the
management buyout process."' By eliminating public shareholders, newly gone
private companies can reduce many expenses which are attributable to the
separation of ownership from management in public companies The pay-
ment of dividends to public shareholders,"' the .compliance with state and
federal securities laws, 9 and the policing of management perquisite expen-
ditures represent significant costs for public companies which management
owned companies are able to reduce or eliminate.5 1 Companies also benefit
from management buyout transactions because managers are able to pursue
more innovative business strategies following buyout transactions without hav-
ing to consider the stock market's reaction to corporate decisionmaking.51
The most frequently cited benefit of management buyouts, however, is
the incentive that private ownership creates for managers to reduce costs and
to increase overall productivity.52 Proponents of management buyouts assert
that managers become revitalized in obtaining equity positions in their
companies . 3 Informed, self-interested managers replace passive public investors
to pursue a compensation structure that more directly rewards corporate
success."4 In addition to the incentive that private ownership creates for cor-
porate performance, the vulnerability of heavily leveraged companies to
allow inside shareholders to benefit at expense of minority shareholders); Longstreth, supra note
2, at 21, col. 2 (state and federal laws do not sufficiently protect shareholders in management
buyout transactions).
46. See De Angelo & De Angelo, supra note 7, at D-2, col. 3 (private ownership creates
gains in corporate productivity that are large enough to benefit all parties involved in buyout);
Hill & Williams, supra note 5, at 6, col. 2 (buyouts produce effiriency gains for corporation);
supra note 8 and accompanying text (minority shareholders benefit from buyout transactions
by receiving premiums for corporate shares).
47. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283, 1308 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore, J., dissent-
ing) (going private transactions can eliminate or reduce many costs attributable to public owner-
ship of company), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
48. See id. (removal of pressure to pay dividends at expense of capital improvements is
one advantage of going private).
49. See supra note 37 (company can save substantial legal and auditing costs by returning
to private ownership).
50. See Wolfson, supra note 26, at 978 (going private transactions eliminate costs of monitor-
ing management's conduct in public companies).
51. See Wantuck, supra note 1, at 60 (buyout transactions allow management to implement
changes previous owners would disallow); Chazen, supra note 38, at 1445 (management buyout
transactions provide managers greater ability to formulate business policy).
52. See Ross, supra note 6, at 78 (management buyouts promote economic efficiency by
providing managers stake in company); Hill & Williams, supra note 5, at 6, col. 2 (management's
enhanced stake in company following buyout transaction can result in heightened corporate
productivity).
53. See Wantuck, supra note 1, at 60 (investment banker states that buyout transaction
can make executive officer into mature entrepreneur).
54. See DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 7, at D-2, col. 3-4 (management buyouts enable
compensation structures that could not be achieved in publicly held companies).
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downturns in the economy further induces management to maximize corporate
cash flows for the purpose of retiring the corporation's leveraged borrowings."
Moreover, management's efforts to reduce corporate borrowings following
buyout transactions often result in producing leaner, more tightly run com-
panies with more efficient capital deployments.5 6 Proponents of management
buyouts therefore contend that buyouts add value to the economy by enabling
companies to operate on less capital, thus freeing capital for other uses. 7
To the extent that buyout transactions produce gains for the corporation
and the corporation's shareholders by redeploying capital and enhancing pro-
ductivity, proponents of management buyouts contend that gains from buyout
transactions increase the value of corporate shares.58 Public investors, therefore,
presumably value a corporation's shares more highly in expectation of post-
merger gains allowing both minority and majority shareholders to benefit from
enhanced market values. 59 Although some buyout proponents concede that
freezeout mergers may prevent minority shareholders from directly participating
in the synergistic gains of buyout transactions, 60 buyout proponents assert
nonetheless that minority shareholders indirectly benefit from buyout trans-
actions because newly merged companies must pay to minority shareholders
a value at least as great as the company's previous trading prices which reflect
the possibility that post merger synergistic gains might one day accrue to the
company in question. 6' Additionally, freezeout mergers facilitate buyout trans-
actions because purchases of public companies might not be profitable to public
investors if the law required investors to share directly with minority
shareholders the synergistic gains which buyouts create.
62
55. See Ross, supra note 6, at 78 (cyclical downturns can imperil company that has heavily
leveraged assets because cash flows are essential to paying off interest charges); Getting Hot,
supra note 1, at 86 (high leverage of management buyouts imposes stricter discipline on managers
enabling company to run on less capital).
56. See Hill & Williams, supra note 5, at 6, col. 2-3 (management capable of reducing
company's accounts receivable and inventory levels following management buyout); Longstreth,
supra note 2, at 15, col. 2 (managers employ corporate assets more efficiently following buyout
transaction).
57. See Ross, supra note 6, at 78 (buyouts help to redeploy capital making excess capital
available for other users); Getting Hot, supra note 1, at 86 (buyouts add to economy by enabling
companies to operate with less capital).
58. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705
(1982). In examining the societal utility of corporate control transactions, Fischel and Easter-
brook maintain that voluntary exchanges of corporate cdntrol move assets to more valued uses
because buyers would not pay a premium for corporate control unless buyers thought corporate
assets could be more efficiently employed. Id. Easterbrook and Fischel therefore argue that the
premium which buyers are willing to pay for corporate control reflects the buyer's anticipated
increase in the value of corporate assets once the buyout transaction takes place. Id.
59. See id. (presumption that anticipated gains from buyout transactions raises market prices
for corporate shares).
60. See id. (Easterbrook and Fischel do not refute fact that freezeout mergers prevent minority
shareholders from receiving premium in buyout transaction).
61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (expectation of benefits from buyout transac-
tions raises market's value for corporate shares).
62. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 58, at 705-06. Easterbrook and Fischel contend
that in freezing out minority shareholders following a buyout transaction, purchasers of cor-
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Another argument supportive of buyout transactions holds that since
market prices are determinant of the value of corporate shares, buyout trans-
actions are necessarily fair to minority shareholders so long as shareholders
receive a price at least as great as the market price for the company's shares
prior to public announcement of the buyout transactions. 63 To maintain that
the market price is in some sense unfair or oppressive to minority shareholders,
as critics of buyout transactions contend, is to challenge the market system
of pricing which underlies a capitalist economy. 6" Proponents of buyout trans-
actions conclude by asserting that the law provides avenues of relief for minority
shareholders should the market occasionally err in valuing corporate shares.5
The law does indeed provide protection for minority shareholders during
mergers and other fundamental changes in corporate structure." The prin-
cipal state protection for shareholders in merger transactions is the remedy
of appraisal. 61 Appraisal statutes typically provide dissenting shareholders the
right to obtain a judicial determination of the fair value of the shareholders'
shares and the opportunity to sell back to the corporation the shareholders'
shares at the judicially determined fair value."8 State legislatures designed the
porate control are merely eliminating free-riding shareholders who neither sold to the purchaser
nor contributed to the profitable transfer of control. Id. To the extent that the expectation of
gains from freezeout transactions induces investors to more highly value corporate shares, all
shareholders benefit from the occurrence of freezeout transactions. Id.
63. See Hetherington, supra note 11, at 234-35. In responding to the criticism that repurchase
tender offers are unfair to public shareholders, Hetherington asserts that the market price is by
definition the current value of a company's shares. Id. Hetherington, moreover, maintains that
corporate repurchases of shares after full disclosure cannot be unfair to public shareholders unless
the market price itself is in some sense unfair or oppressive. Id. at 235.
64. Id. at 235-37 (minority shares only have value as an investment and the law should
ignore idiosyncratic attachments).
65. See infra notes 67-121 and accompanying text (discussion of state protections for minority
shareholders), 122-59 and accompanying text (federal protections for shareholders in buyout
transactions).
66. See 6 Z. CAvrrcH, supra note 23, § 112.02[1], at 112-13 to -25 (state laws generally
provide shareholders right of appraisal following mergers, consolidations, and sales of substan-
tially all corporate assets).
67. See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness Of The Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HLv.
L. R-v. 1189, 1191 (1964) (availability of appraisal remedy may foreclose shareholders from other
forms of relief); Note, Corporations-Exclusiveness Of The Appraisal Remedy-Legislature In-
tended That All Actions Be Barred Except For An Appraisal After Consummation Of A Merger,
84 DIcK. L. Rav. 543, 547-48 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Exclusive Remedy] (appraisal is ex-
clusive remedy for dissenting shareholders in Pennsylvania); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262 (1983) (procedure for effecting Delaware's appraisal remedy); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
156B, §§ 86-90 (West 1973) (Massachusetts appraisal remedy); TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art.
5.11-5.13 (Vernon 1983) (Texas appraisal procedure).
68. See 6 CAvrrcH, supra note 23, § 112.01, at 112-4 to 5 (appraisal statutes afford
shareholders right to withdraw from corporation at fair value); Comment, Bell v. Kirby Lumber
Corp: Ascertaining "Fair Value" Under The Delaware Appraisal Statute, 81 CoLum. L. Rav.
426, 426 (1981) (appraisal statutes afford shareholder right to receive compensation in place of
shares). In order to enforce the statutory right of appraisal, a dissenting shareholder must follow
the statutory appraisal procedure of the jurisdiction in question. See 6 CAvrrcH, supra note 23,
§ 112.03[21, at 112-54 to -56. Most state appraisal procedures involve a six step process which
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appraisal remedy to replace the veto power over all changes in corporate struc-
ture that each shareholder had possessed under the common law.69 While
unanimous shareholder consent for changes in corporate structure proved too
restrictive for the needs of modem business, state appraisal proceedings pro-
vide management too much flexibility in altering shareholder rights. 70
Although legislatures intended for appraisal to serve as a check on manage-
ment's ability to freeze out minority shareholders at prices which manage-
ment unilaterally sets in the merger agreement, shareholders may utilize the
appraisal remedy only after fundamental changes in corporate structure occur.
7'
The appraisal remedy, therefore, allows shareholders to challenge the price
at which a freezeout merger has divested minority shares without providing
shareholders a means of challenging the merger itself.7" Moreover, appraisal
allows management groups to consummate a freezeout transaction despite ob-
jections to the price that the corporation will pay for minority shares since
state legislatures have designed the appraisal remedy to resolve all questions
concerning the fair value of minority shares. 73 To the extent that appraisal
proceedings can accurately value minority shares, appraisals do protect minority
shareholders from exploitation in freezeout transactions. 74 Whether appraisal
proceedings are in fact successful in valuing corporate shares, however, is an
issue of considerable controversy.
7"
first requires a dissenting shareholder to file a written objection to the pending transaction at
the time of or prior to the shareholder meeting at which the board of directors will act on the
pending transaction. Id. The dissenting shareholder, however, must either vote against the pro-
posed transaction or abstain from voting entirely. Id. The dissenting shareholder must next make
a formal demand for payment and file a written notice of the dissenting election within a stated
period after the corporation has informed the dissenting shareholder that a majority of shareholders
have authorized the proposed transaction. Id. The dissenting shareholder must finally submit
his share certificates after electing to dissent and initiate legal proceedings if the amount which
the corporation offers is unacceptable and the corporation has not initiated legal proceedings
upon the dissenting shareholders' refusal to accept the corporation's offer. Id.
69. See 13 W. FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDA oF THE LAw oF PuvATE CORPORATiONs § 5906.1
(rev. perm. ed. 1980) (states enacted appraisal statutes to afford relief to dissenters following
changes in corporate structure); Comment, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes,
79 HARv. L. RLv. 1453, 1453 (1966) (states enacted appraisal statutes to replace common-law
right of shareholders to veto changes in corporate structure).
70. See Exclusive Remedy, supra note 67, at 546-47 (unanimous consent requirement was
unsatisfactory to both corporation and dissenting shareholders); infra notes 71-82 and accompa-
nying text (appraisal remedy favors management in management buyouts transactions).
71. See 6 Z. CAvrrcH, supra note 23, § 112.02[1], at 112-16 (dissenting shareholders' right
to be bought out is contingent on consummation of corporate transactions); 13 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 69, at § 5906.7 (procedure to obtain appraisal generally requires shareholders to give
notice to corporation within stated period of time following resolution authorizing merger).
72. See supra note 68 (appraisal provides means for shareholder to equitably depart from
corporate ownership).
73. See Vorenberg, supra note 67, at 1191 (availability of appraisal remedy may foreclose
shareholders from other forms of judicial relief); Exclusive Remedy, supra note 67, at 547-48
(appraisal is exclusive remedy for dissenting shareholders in Pennsylvania).
74. See In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 263 Pa. Super. Ct. 378, 389, 398 A.2d 186,
192 (1979) (appraisal remedy protects interests of both shareholders and corporations).
75. See Peliman v. Cinerama, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (procedural
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In determining the value of dissenting shareholders' shares, appraisal pro-
ceedings often rely heavily on the price at which the corporation's shares were
trading prior to public announcement of the merger transaction.76 Because
the value of control of a public company commands a premium over the price
at which a company's shares normally trade, 7 court reliance on pre-tender
offer market prices precludes shareholders electing the appraisal remedy from
receiving any portion of the premium that typically accompanies tender offers. 7'
Shareholders whose companies are conducting a freezeout of minority shares
may confront the alternatives of accepting management's tender offer at a
price that does not reflect the company's value or electing the appraisal remedy
to produce a still lower judicial valuation." Either way, management is able
to purchase the corporation at a price which management perceives to be
favorable, particularly when the market is depressed at the time of the buyout.10
defects in state appraisal proceedings prevent victims from receiving adequate relief in freezeout
mergers); Weinberger v UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (court terms Delaware's valua-
tion procedure as structured, mechanistic, and outmoded); Vorenberg, supra note 67, at 1201
(resort to appraisal under best state statutory procedures provides shareholders with less than
fair value); Fair Shares, supra note 32, at 306 (judicial procedure of appraisal proceedings is
likely to underestimate future earnings of old enterprise).
76. See Harriman v. E.I. duPont Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 135, 154 (D. Del. 1975)
(Delaware law requires only that corporation pay to displaced shareholders premerger value of
exchanged shares); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 391 (Del. Ch. 1979) (con-
trol group's offer of premium over market price constitutes prima facie evidence of fairness);
Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 72 (Del. 1968) (fair market value is best measure
of fair value of corporate shares in most circumstances); Deutschman, 281 App. Div. 14, 22-23,
116 N.Y.S.2d 578, 585, (1st Dept. 1952) (court holds that current market value is certainly fair
indication of value of minority's interest).
77. See Lipton, Takeover Bids In The Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 132-33 (1979)
(list of previous tender offer bids all involving large premiums); Weiss, supra note 27, at 679
(transactions prove that value of corporate shares is greater than normal trading prices when
person is bidding for control).
78. See Chazen, supra note 38, at 1443-44. Courts have generally upheld acquisitions by
controlling shareholders as fair so long as the displaced public shareholders received cash or securities
of an equivalent value to the stock the public shareholders surrendered. Id.; see Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1246-47 (7th Cir.) (court uses average market prices for six months
preceding buyout transaction to determine fair value of minority shares), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
922 (1977); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, -, 93 A.2d 107, 114 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1952) (court places reliance on market value of minority shares prior to merger transac-
tion to value minority shares subsequent to merger); supra note 76 (courts traditionally rely on
past market prices to value minority shares). Some commentators, however, argue that gains
arising from the expectation of a merger should be shared with minority shareholders. See Note
On Going Private, supra note 19, at 1037 (minority shareholders are entitled to portion of gains
which corporation realizes through forced elimination of public shareholders); Fair Shares, supra
note 32, at 311 n.37 (market prices are uniformly inadequate to measure contributions of parties
to merger); Vorenberg, supra note 67, at 1202-03 (market price may reflect past distortions in
economy or industry).
79. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. 1-2 (appraisal remedy unlikely to yield higher
price than management's tender offer); Sommer, supra note 14, at D-3 (shareholders confront
empty choice of tendering shares or becoming liquidated in cashout merger).
80. See Berkowitz v. Power Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 43, 342 A.2d 566, 570 (1975)




Management, moreover, is in a position to artificially deflate the market value
of the corporation's shares, a practice which may ensure favorably low prices
preceding a buyout and against which the SEC has few safeguards.81 Appraisal
proceeding reliance on market prices for valuing minority shares, therefore,
favors management's interests because management has access to information
concerning their company's true value as a going concern and will be likely
to engage in buyout transactions when the market undervalues the company's
shares.2
State courts, however, have recognized the limitations of the appraisal
remedy in protecting minority shareholders and have responded by expanding
the valuation procedures available in appraisal proceedings.8 3 In the recent
case of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.84 a plaintiff attempted to present evidence
of corporate value using the discounted cash flow valuation technique.85 The
lower court rejected the plaintiff's discounted cash flow method of valuing
the corporation's shares and held that evidence of valuation must be consis-
tent with practice under prior Delaware appraisal proceeding case law.
86
81. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 20, col. 4. In deflating a corporation's trading prices
prior to a buyout transaction, managers have broad discretion in reporting corporate financial
information. Id. Management can affect earnings adversely by altering inventory, depreciation,
or loss reserves accounting techniques. Id. The nonpayment of dividends, the sale of assets, and
the deflation of earnings all provide management opportunities to deflate the corporation's market
prices. Id. The SEC, moreover, has designed reporting conventions to guard against unduly op-
timistic financial reporting and has had little experience guarding against fraud in pessimistic
reporting. Id. Although intentionally deflating a corporation's trading prices in preparation for
a management buyout constitutes fraud under federal securities laws, courts afford a great deal
of discretion to corporate fiduciaries in making business judgments. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j,
78j(b) (1934) (Section 10(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits use of fraudulent
devices in securities transactions). Moreover, management may engage in conduct which has the
effect of depressing stock market prices for the legitimate purpose of strengthening the corpora-
tion's balance sheet. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 21, col. I (legitimate business practices
may have interim effect of depressing stock market prices); infra notes 191-92 and accompanying
text (court will not interfere with management's business judgment so long as court can find
rational business purpose to management's conduct).
82. See Brudney, supra note 3, at 1095. Brudney's contention is that the market cannot
correctly value a corporation's shares because the market does not possess inside information
concerning the firm's future prospects. Id. Brudney asserts further that market imperfections
such as under-valuation of share prices enhances the temptation of corporate insiders who do
possess inside information to pursue personal gain by taking companies private. Id. at 1096;
see supra note 1 (allure of economic interests induces management to take companies private).
83. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (court terms Delaware's
appraisal remedy valuation procedure as "outmoded").
84. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
85. Id. at 712 (Chancellor rejected use of discounted cash flow method of valuation as
not corresponding with either logic or existing law); see V. BRuDNEY & M. CHE TmE, CoR-
PoRATE FINANCE 3-59 (1981) (discussion of techniques for valuing going concerns). In arriving
at the value a purchaser would currently pay for a company's future earnings, the discounted
cash flow technique accounts for the time value of money. Id. at 36. Because banks and institu-
tions are willing to pay interest for the use of an individual's cash, a dollar paid in the future
is worth less than a dollar payable today. Id. The discounted cash flow technique discounts or
reduces the value of expected future earnings to reflect the fact that earnings available in the
future are worth less than earnings available in the present. Id.
86. 457 A.2d at 712.
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Although Delaware's appraisal statute does not specify the techniques by which
courts are to conduct valuation of public companies, 7 Delaware courts have
fashioned a rigid procedure of valuation known as the Delaware Block
Approach.8" Under the Delaware block approach to valuation, the court first
determines a corporation's market value, earnings value, and asset value. 9
The court next assigns a percentage weight to each value and sums the weighted
values to produce an appraised value for the corporation." The Weinberger
court, however, determined that the Delaware block procedure was outmoded,
structured, and mechanistic, and held that appraisal proceedings must in the
future allow proof of value by any of the techniques of valuation acceptable
in the financial community.9 1 The financial community in fact uses a series
of valuation techniques to ascertain the value of public companies including
the discounted cash flow procedure, 92 the capitalization of prospective
earnings, 93 and the comparison of purchase prices to recent sales of similar
companies in open market transactions.9"
87. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1953) (procedure for valuing public companies does
not appear in Delaware's appraisal statute).
88. See Sporberg v. City Specialty Stores, 35 Del. Ch. 560, _, 123 A.2d 121, 124-27
(Del. Ch. 1956) (Delaware courts utilize Delaware block approach to value public companies
during appraisal proceedings).
89. See id. (court discerns value of corporation's assets, future earnings, and outstanding
shares). In determining the value of a corporation's assets, the court looks to the fair market
value of the corporation's assets at the time of the merger. See Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij,
243 A.2d 67, 70-72 (Del. 1968). The earnings value reflects the corporation's averaged earnings,
capitalized at an industry derived capitalization rate. See Universal City Studios v. Francis I.
DuPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218-22 (Del. 1975) (court considers industry outlooks in determin-
ing appropriate multiplier); In re Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800, 804 (Del. Ch. 1968)
(court included past sales as one factor in determining appropriate earnings multiple). Finally,
the court looks to the trading price of the corporation's shares on the last day bWfore announce-
ment of the merger to assign a value to the corporation's shares. See Levin v. Midland-Ross
Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, - , 194 A.2d 50, 53-54 (Del. Ch. 1963).
90. See Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 72-73 (Del. 1968) (court adds weighted
values to determine true value of corporate shares); Sporberg v. City Specialty Stores, 35 Del.
Ch. 560, -, 123 A.2d 121, 124-27 (Del. Ch. 1956) (weighted values of earnings, assets, and
market price comprise the value of corporate shares).
91. 457 A.2d at 713.
92. See supra note 85 (discounted cash flow technique accounts for time value of money
with respect to future cash flows).
93. See V. BRuDnNY & M. CamEtsrmN, supra note 85, at 3-59 (1981) (discussion of techni-
ques for valuing going concerns). In valuing a stream of payments which will continue in perpetuity,
an investor will frequently multiply the payment which the investor expects to receive each year
by the reciprocal of an appropriate discount rate. Id. at 36. The investor can derive an appropriate
discount rate for a stream of future payments by adding to the rate of interest an investor would
receive on a hypothetical riskless investment a premium to account for the risk intrinsic to the
investment in question. See J. BoNBRiGHT, THE VALUATION op PROPERTY 219 (1965) (factors of
pure interest and risk premium comprise discount rate). Once the investor determines the time
value of money or discount rate which another would pay for the use of funds for a particular
investment, the investor multiplies the payment which the investor expects to receive in each year
by the reciprocal of the discount rate. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHamEsmiN, supra note 85, at
36. This process of multiplying a payment which an investor expects to receive each year in perpetuity
by the reciprocal of a discount rate is known as capitalizing a future income stream. Id.
94. See Chazen, supra note 38, at 1478 (possible to determine fairness of controlling
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The Weinberger court's broadening of admissible appraisal proceeding
valuation evidence represents a significant advancement in Delaware case law. 95
Delaware courts have been very reluctant to deviate from precedents using
the block approach despite convincing evidence that the block approach is
too restrictive a procedure to arrive at accurate valuations in certain
circumstances. 96 By permitting the use of modem valuation techniques in
Delaware appraisal proceedings, the Weinberger court has increased the prob-
ability that appraisal proceedings will produce accurate valuations of corporate
shares. 97 Moreover, minority shareholders will now be able to present in ap-
praisal proceedings the modern techniques of valuation which management
has likely utilized in planning the buyout transaction." Some commentators
have suggested additionally that Weinberger's expanded appraisal remedy will
result in higher appraised values of public companies, benefitting electing
shareholders.9 9 Since Delaware is a leading state in the area of corporate and
securities laws, other states may similarly permit the use of modem valuation
techniques in statutory appraisal proceedings. 100
In addition to the protection which the appraisal remedy provides to
minority shareholders, a majority of states protect minority shareholders by
enjoining on equitable grounds transactions for which the appraisal remedy
would not provide adequate relief.' Particularly in cases involving fraud,
misrepresentation, self-dealing, or waste of corporate assets, state courts fre-
shareholder's offer by comparisons to negotiated acquisitions of public shares in similar companies).
95. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (Weinberger court's valuations procedure
represents significant change from previous Delaware valuation procedure).
96. See Levin v. Midland Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, -, 194 A.2d 50, 58 (Del. Ch.
1963) (despite court's recognition that appraiser's high weighting of asset value was appropriate,
court lowered asset value weight to conform with Delaware precedents); Weiss, supra note 27,
at 655 (failure of Delaware block approach to include post merger value of company results in
less than fair valuations of shareholder interests); Comment, Tannetics Inc. v. A.J. Indust., 5
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 337, 346-48 (1980) (court insisted on averaging earnings over five year period
in conformance with precedents despite convincing evidence that three year earnings period was
more appropriate).
97. See Berger & Allingham, A New Light on Cash-Out Mergers: Weinberger Eclipses Singer,
39 Bus. LAw. 1, 22 (1983) (new appraisal approach should yield shareholders greater fair values).
98. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (finance professionals use series of modern
valuation techniques to discern value of ongoing companies).
99. See Berger & Allingham, supra note 97, at 22 (appraisals utilizing modem valuation
techniques will likely provide minority shareholders greater value for minority shares than ap-
praisals utilizing Delaware block approach).
100. See Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility In The Management Of The Corporation, 31 Bus.
LAw. 883, 889 (1976) (large proportion of all corporate litigation occurs in State of Delaware
because of disproportionate number of corporations with Delaware charters).
101. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570 (5th Cir.) (court enjoined
merger under Georgia law for serving no legitimate business purposes), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1974); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (court will interfere with
corporation's decision to pay dividend despite corporation's compliance with dividend statute
when plaintiff can prove corporation paid dividend for improper purposes); Berkowitz v.
Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 49-50, 342 A.2d 566, 570-74 (1975) (court enjoined merger
to secure interests of minority shareholders despite compliance with state merger statute).
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quently provide equitable relief for the protection of minority shareholders.' 02
A minority of states, however, have gone even further in protecting shareholder
rights by recognizing an equity right of shareholders to continued participa-
tion in the corporation which extends beyond the right of shareholders to receive
fair value for displaced shares.
10 3
For example, in the California case of Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc.,"0 4 the
plaintiff shareholder brought an action to obtain injunctive relief preventing
Bourns, Inc. (Bourns) from engaging in a merger transaction for the purpose
of eliminating Bourns' publicly held shares.0 5 Bourns argued to the court that
injunctive relief was inappropriate because California's appraisal remedy was
capable of adequately protecting minority shareholder interests. 0 6 The
Jutkowitz court, however, held that shareholder values other than the right
to receive fair value subsequent to the merger transaction were at stake in
going private transactions. 0 7 Specifically, the Jutkowitz court stated that
shareholders may have differing tax problems, investment goals, or personal
attachments to specific companies for which the appraisal remedy could not
provide adequate relief after a buyout transaction had occurred. 00 The
Jutkowitz court, therefore, enjoined Bourns from engaging in any transaction
that would compel the retirement of Bourn's publicly held shares.0 9
In establishing that a shareholder has personal interests in a share of stock
which the appraisal remedy is incapable of protecting, the Jutkowtiz court
opened the way for minority shareholders to challenge directly buyout trans-
actions despite the availability of the appraisal remedy."0 To the extent that
the appraised value of minority shares does not satisfy the differing invest-
ment interests of shareholders, appraisal should not preclude shareholder ac-
102. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 219 (2d Cir. 1977) (courts of New York
show no hesitancy in granting injunctive relief where appraisal remedy is not available to protect
shareholders), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Zimmerman v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co.,
61 Cal. App. 2d 585, -, 143 P.2d 409, 411-12 (1943) (court provided equitable relief to
shareholder following inequitable dissolution transaction); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701,714 (Del. 1983) (Chancellor may provide any form of equitable relief when appraisal remedy
is not sufficient to protect minority shareholders).
103. See infra notes 103-21 and accompanying text (minority of states recognize shareholders
equitable right to continued participation in corporation).
104. CA 000268, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975).
105. See Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 3d 102, 105, 173 Cal. Rptr. 248, 249
(1981) (Bourns family intended to take company private through freezeout merger transaction).
106. See Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc., CA 000268, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975),
as reported in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 n.8 (Del. 1977) (defendant argued
that appraisal was sufficient to protect plaintiff shareholder because appraisal would provide
fair value of plaintiff's shares).
107. See id. (money will not satisfy all shareholder interests).
108. See id. (although some or most minority shareholders will be satisfied to receive money
payments, other shareholders will have different judgments as to desirability of selling out).
109. See Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 3d 102, 105, 173 Cal. Rptr. 248, 249
(1981) (Jutkowitz obtained preliminary injunction preventing freezeout attempts).
110. See Berger & Allingham, supra note 97, at 7 (court's acknowledgement of shareholder's
nonpecuniary right in corporate shares which appraisal remedy cannot protect allows shareholders
to directly challenge merger transactions).
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tions to enjoin pending freezeout transactions.' In Singer v. Magnavox,"2
the Delaware Supreme Court relied in part on the Jutkowitz decision in holding
that a shareholder possesses an equity right to continued participation in the
corporation which extends beyond a right to receive fair value in subsequent
appraisal proceedings." 3 In Singer, former minority shareholders of the
Magnavox Corporation brought an action in the Delaware Court of Chancery
to nullify a merger that Magnavox's parent company had arranged for the
purpose of freezing out Magnavox's minority shareholders." The Supreme
Court of Delaware stated on appeal that a parent company, as the controlling
shareholder of its subsidiary companies, owes the subsidiary's public
shareholders a fiduciary duty of fairness which the parent company violates
by engaging in mergers for the sole purpose of freezing out minority
shareholders." 5 The Singer court held that a parent company must possess
a proper business purpose for carrying out a merger which eliminates minority
shares to avoid breaching the parent company's fiduciary duty to shareholders
of.the subsidiary companies. 1 6 Although the Singer court stated that
shareholders possess legally protected rights in owning a corporation's shares
which extend beyond the right to receive fair value in post-merger appraisal
proceedings, ' " the Singer court was not specific in describing a shareholder's
legally protected rights.' Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court has subse-
quently broadened the definition of a proper business purpose to such a degree
as to permit freezeout mergers in most instances 1 9 and has recently determined
I 11. See id. at 7-8 (shareholder's equity right in shares provided minority shareholders grounds
to challenge consummation of freezeout mergers).
112. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
113. Id. at 980 (shareholders abuse corporate process by engaging in freezeout mergers for
sole purpose of divesting minority shareholders).
114. Id. at 971-73 (acquiring corporation had obtained 84.1% of Magnavox's outstanding
shares prior to conducting freezeout of Magnavox's remaining shareholders).
115. Id. at 978.
116. See id. at 980 & n. 11. In holding that a party abuses the corporate process by conduct-
ing a freezeout merger for the sole purpose of divesting minority shareholders, the Singer court
indicated that a freezeout merger is valid if the merger serves proper business purposes. Id. The
Singer court, however, specifically declined to elaborate on whether a merger must serve the business
purposes of the subsidiary corporation or the business purposes of the parent corporation in
order to be valid. Id.
117. See id. at 977 (Singer court states that shareholder's right is not exclusively in value
of equity investment).
118. See id. Although the Singer court strongly denied that a dissenting shareholder has
no legally protected rights beyond the right to receive fair value from the majority shareholders,
the Singer court did not elaborate on what a dissenting shareholder's other legally protected rights
were. Id. The Singer court, however, did cite Jutkowitz v. Bourns for the proposition that
shareholders have differing interests in corporate shares which may lead to differing judgments
as to the desirability of selling out. Id. at 977 n.8; see Jutkowitz v. Bourns, CA 000268, slip
op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975) (shareholders have differing investment goals, tax problems,
and sentimental attachments).
119. See Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Del. 1977) (discussing Singer's
proper business purpose requirement for parent-subsidiary mergers). In Tanzer v. Int'l Indus.,
International General Industries (IGI) sought to merge IGI's 81% owned subsidiary into IGI
for the purpose of facilitating IGI's long term debt financing. Id. at 1124. The Delaware Supreme
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that Singer's business purpose requirement does not serve any function at all. 20
Nevertheless, courts in a growing minority of states have cited Singer v.
Magnavox for the proposition that a parent company must possess a valid
business purpose for freezing out minority shareholders and have awarded
equitable relief to minority shareholders whose companies have attempted to
complete mergers for the sole purpose of eliminating minority shares.
12
In addition to state protections for minority shareholders, federal law also
provides protection against shareholder exploitation in management buyout
transactions. 22 The jurisdiction of federal courts to regulate management
buyouts, however, has been an issue of considerable controversy. 23 In 1977,
the SEC proposed rules that would have required buyout transactions to be
fair to minority shareholders. 2 4 Commentators on the proposed rule, however,
quickly responded that Congress had not granted the SEC authority to regulate
buyout transactions because buyout transactions were an area of state concern
2
1
Court held on appeal that a merger which conveys economic benefit to a parent corporation
is a legitimate merger under Singer's proper business purpose requirement. Id. at 1124-25. The
Delaware Supreme Court, moreover, held that freezeout mergers between parent and subsidiary
corporations which solely benefit the parent company do not violate Singer's business purpose
requirement so long as the parent company's real interest in causing the merger is not the elimina-
tion of minority shareholders. Id.
120. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (discussing utility of Singer's
business purpose requirement for parent-subsidiary mergers). In reviewing the protections available
to Delaware shareholders during parent-subsidiary mergers, the Weinberger court questioned whether
Singer's business purpose requirement provided additional meaningful protection to shareholders.
Id. The Weinberger court suggested that Delaware's expanded appraisal remedy in particular
was sufficient to adequately protect minority shareholders. Id.; see supra notes 91-100 and ac-
companying text (Weinberger court greatly expands valuation criteria for Delaware's appraisal
proceedings).
121. See Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754, 756-57 (D. Utah 1974) (court set aside
merger on grounds that merger served no business purpose other than termination of minority
shareholder interests and therefore breached controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders under Utah law); Per v. IU Int'l Corp., 607 P.2d 1036, 1046 (Hawaii 1980) (merger
for sole purpose of divesting minority shareholders is a violation of fiduciary principles under
Hawaii law and appraisal is not exclusive remedy for minority shareholders in such cases); Gabhart
v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, -, 370 N.E.2d 345, 357-58 (1977) (merger which serves no valid
corporate purpose other than elimination of minority shares is a de facto dissolution which
shareholders may enjoin); Clark v. Pattern Analysis, 87 Misc. 2d 385, 388-90, 384 N.Y.2d 660,
- (1976) (freezing out of minority shareholders violates controlling shareholders' fiduciary
obligation to minority shareholders absent valid corporate purpose).
122. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 19, col. 1-2 (discussion of federal protections for minority
shareholders in freezeout transactions); infra text accompanying notes 135-59 (inadequacy of federal
protections for minority shareholders in buyout transactions).
123. See Note, Regulating Going Private Transactions: SEC Rule 13e-3, 80 CoLtJM. L. Rv.
782, 786 (1980) (Congress has not authorized SEC to regulate fairness of buyout transactions
which are subject to state concern).
124. See id. at 786 & n.40 (rule would have made illegal going private transactions unless
going private transaction was fair to "unaffiliated security-holders").
125. See SEC Release No. 34-16075, 44 FED. REG. 46, 736 (1979) (criticism of proposed
SEC rule that would have required that going private transactions be fair to minority shareholders
in accordance with SEC determinations); Brudney, supra note 3, at 1098 (organized security bar
1032
MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green.126 In
Santa Fe, former minority shareholders of the Kirby Lumber Corporation
(Kirby) brought an action to set aside a merger between Kirby and Santa Fe
Industries (Santa Fe) on the grounds that the merger violated section 10(b)
of the '34 Act which prohibits the use of any fraudulent or manipulative devices
in the sale of securities. 27 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Sante Fe
had breached the prohibitions of the '34 Act' 2 8 and Santa Fe's fiduciary duty
to Kirby's minority shareholders by obtaining a fraudulent appraisal of Kirby's
value for the purpose of freezing out Kirby's public shareholders at a wholly
inadequate price.1 29 Moreover, Santa Fe owned 95 percent of Kirby's outstand-
ing shares prior to the merger transactions and was therefore able to set the
price that Kirby shareholders were to receive for Kirby's shares pursuant to
Delaware's one-step merger statute.' 3' The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, however, found that Santa Fe had fully
disclosed to Kirby's minority shareholders the information with which Santa
Fe had valued Kirby's minority shares without omission, misstatement, or
fraudulent conduct that would have impeded a shareholder's choice between
accepting Santa Fe's offering price or electing appraisal.' 3 ' On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that Santa Fe had not violated section 10(b) of the '34
Act prohibiting manipulation and deception because Santa Fe had made full
and fair disclosures to Kirby minority shareholders in compliance with the
Securities and Exchange Act.3 2 The Supreme Court further stated that sec-
tion 10(b) of the '34 Act did not apply to a fiduciary's use of a freezeout
merger to eliminate minority shares because state law generally governs alleged
abuses in going private transactions as well as allegations of corporate fiduciary
self-dealing. 3 3 The Supreme Court concluded by stating that absent clear in-
responded sharply that Congress had not authorized SEC to require that transactions be "fair"
to shareholders).
126. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
127. Id. at 467-68; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (§ 10(b) of '34 Act).
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (§ 10(b) of '34 Act); id. § 78m(e) (§ 13(e) of '34 Act
authorizes SEC to design regulations for purpose of preventing "fraudulent," "deceptive," or
"manipulative" practices in sale of securities).
129. See 430 U.S. at 467 (plaintiff alleged that Santa Fe had obtained an unrealistically low
appraisal of Santa Fe's stock so that Santa Fe's shareholders would believe that Santa Fe's offer
was generous).
130. Id. at 465; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (1979) (parent company may effect
short-form merger of subsidiary company if parent company owns at least 90% of subsidiary's
outstanding shares); supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (freezeout procedures for effecting
going private transactions).
131. See 430 U.S. at 474 (Santa Fe had furnished to minority shareholders all relevant infor-
mation concerning Santa Fe's offer to purchase minority shares).
132. See id. at 474-80 (complaint failed to allege material misrepresentation or failures to
disclose and thus involved no manipulation or deception under '34 Act); supra note 128 (Con-
gress authorized SEC to design regulations prohibiting fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
practices in sale of securities).
133. See 430 U.S. at 479-80 (state law defines duties and obligations of corporate fiduciaries).
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dications of congressional intent, the Court would continue to be reluctant
to federalize state fiduciary standards for internal corporate affairs.'34
The effect of the Santa Fe decision is to deny federal jurisdiction to claims
contesting the fairness of going private transactions unless an omission,
misstatement, or fraudulent act is present to bring the buyout transaction within
the ambit of the '34 Act.13 The SEC, therefore, retracted the 1977 proposed
rules that would have required that buyout transactions be fair to minority
shareholders and instead issued SEC rule 13e-3 in 1979 to respond to the prob-
lem of management buyout transactions.136 SEC rule 13e-3 requires that com-
panies contemplating a going private transaction make a series of disclosures,
the most significant of which are whether the nonmanagement directors have
approved the transaction, 137 whether the transaction requires the ratification
of shareholders not affiliated with the purchasing group, 138 whether manage-
ment reasonably believes the transaction is fair to public shareholders, 139 and
whether the company has obtained a fairness opinion.140 Critics of manage-
ment buyouts, however, contend that rule 13e-3's disclosure requirements are
ineffectual in securing fairness for displaced shareholders during management
buyout transactions.' 4 ' The approval of nonmanagement directors to the terms
of a buyout agreement is not likely to assure fairness for minority shareholders
because nonmanagement directors are likely to have business or personal ties
to management and the management directors who frequently select the non-
management directors.' 2 Similarly, the vote of shareholders who are not af-
filiated with the purchasing group is of questionable value in assuring fairness
134. Id.
135. See id. at 478-80 (Court may not derive corporate fiduciary standards mergers from
'34 Act); Longstreth, supra note 2, at 19, col. 1-2 (Santa Fe decision denies shareholders right
to contest fairness in any federal forum).
136. See 17 C.F.R. SS 140.13e-3, 240.13e-100 (1979) (SEC Rule 13e-3); Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 16075, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,166 at 82,123-31
(Aug. 2, 1979) (discussion of disclosure requirements for going private transactions); see also
Radolv. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1310-11 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (SEC enacted rule 13e-3 in response
to problem of overreaching in going private transactions).
137. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1979) (item 8(d) of rule 13e-3 requires disclosure of whether
majority of directors not employees of issuer have approved transactions).
138. See id. (item 8(c) of rule 13e-3 requires disclosure of whether transaction requires ap-
proval of unaffiliated shareholders).
139. See id. (item 8(a) of rule 13e-3 requires disclosure of whether transaction requires ap-
proval of unaffiliated shareholders).
139. See id. (item 8(a) of rule 13e-3 requires disclosure of whether issuer reasonably believes
transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated shareholders).
140. See id. (item 9(a) & (b) of rule 13e-3 requires disclosure of whether issuer has obtained
an appraisal from an outside party).
141. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 19, col. 2 (SEC commissioner Longstreth questions
effectiveness of Rule 13e-3 disclosures in assuring fairness for minority shareholders); Thomas,
A Free Ride for Management Insiders, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, at D-2, col. 4 (criticizing
present lack of disclosure in management buyout process).
142. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 20, col. I (Longstreth discounts effectiveness of out-
side director approval in securing fairness for minority shareholders because sentiments of direc-
tors are normally with management rather than shareholders).
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for minority shareholders when unaffiliated shareholders are not in a position
to evaluate the terms of the buyout transaction and perceive no alternatives
to accepting management's offer. Finally, management's personal interest in
a management buyout transaction leads one to question the value of manage-
ment's opinion as to whether the transaction is fair to minority shareholders
in assuring fairness for minority shareholders.143 Although SEC rule 13e-3 does
not actually require that a company contemplating a buyout transaction im-
plement the practices which the rule requires to be disclosed, a former SEC
commissioner has suggested that a company's use of rule 13e-3's disclosed
practices may give the appearance that the SEC has sanctioned the fairness
of the buyout transaction. ' 4 To the extent that rule 13e-3's disclosure re-
quirements fail to assure fairness for minority shareholders and create the
misleading impression that the SEC has reviewed the fairness of the buyout
transaction, rule 13-e may be more of a boon to management contemplating
a buyout transaction than a protection for minority shareholders. 45
SEC rule 13e-3's most significant disclosure requirement, however, is
whether the corporation has obtained a fairness opinion from an independent
financial institution. 41 Investment banking firms normally issue fairness opin-
ions which state that the financial terms of a transaction are fair to public
shareholders.' 7 While SEC rule 13e-3 does not actually require controlling
shareholders to obtain a fairness opinion, an investment banker's opinion on
fairness may favorably influence a court or shareholder in reviewing the fairness
of a buyout transaction. 48 A favorable opinion on fairness, however, does
not mean that management's offering price to minority shareholders is similar
143. See Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978) (court does not give legal
effect to minority shareholder vote in part because majority shareholders have influence over
subsidiary corporations); Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 301, 141 A.2d 458, 460 (Del. 1958)
(court acknowledges fact that shareholders will seldom'oppose management in shareholder meetings);
Weiss, supra note 27, at 676 (shareholders frequently behave like sheep when voting on trans-
actions and normally support management's recommendation).
144. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 20, col. 2 (SEC Rule 13e-3's disclosure requirements
may encourage buyout transactions because disclosures provide management groups with SEC
approved procedure for conducting transaction).
145. See id. at 21, col. 2 (Longstreth questions adequacy of state and federal protections
in buyout transactions). In criticizing the effectiveness of SEC Rule 13e-3's disclosure requirements
for the protection of minority shareholders, Commissioner Longstreth stated that Rule 13e-3's
disclosures protect management from shareholder attacks but fail to assure fairness for shareholder.
Id. Longstreth moreover terms Rule 13e-3's disclosure requirements as "boilerplated passkeys"
to advantageous buyouts. Id.
146. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1979) (items 9(a) & (b) of SEC Rule 13e-3 require disclosure
of whether an outside party has considered fairness of management's offer to minority shareholders
and content of outside party's findings with respect to company's value).
147. See Chazen, supra note 38, at 1442 (boards of directors normally obtain fairness opin-
ions prior to corporate acquisitions).
148. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Del. Ch. 1977)
(entire fairness of buyout transaction is determinative of whether management has fulfilled fiduciary
obligation to shareholders); Longstreth, supra note 2, at 19, col. 3 (fairness opinion provides
powerful support for board's judgment in buyout transactions).
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to the value a third party might pay for the same minority interests.'4 9 On
the contrary, a determination of financial fairness accommodates a large range
of managerial discretion and represents only that a given offer is not
unreasonably low in relation to a company's other sale opportunities.'"
The latitude inherent in fairness opinions derives from the standard which
courts apply to test a corporate fiduciary's conduct in differing contexts."'
The standard which most states apply to test a corporate fiduciary's conduct
is the business judgment standard.. 2 The business judgment standard presumes
that corporate fiduciaries act in good faith and exercise sound business judg-
ment which courts will not disturb in the absence of bad faith, fraud, or
palpable overreaching.'"5 Because courts test a corporate fiduciary's conduct
under the business judgment standard, a corporate fiduciary does not require
a financial opinion which states that an offer is the highest or best available
to minority shareholders in a corporate control transaction.15 A fairness opin-
ion reflecting the business judgment standard's presumption of good faith is
sufficient to justify both the fairness of the sale transaction and the fiduciary's
conduct in making the purchase.' Moreover, a corporate fiduciary does not
require a financial opinion which states that the price minority shareholders
receive in a freezeout transaction is equivalent to that which minority
shareholders would likely receive in an arms-length negotiation.' A fairness
opinion reflecting the business judgment standard's presumption of good faith
serves the fiduciary's purpose of justifying the fairness of the merger transac-
tion and the fiduciary's conduct in executing the merger. 5 7 Although a
149. See Chazen, supra note 38, at 1454 (fairness opinions cover a large range of fair prices
and do not assure shareholders that management's offering price is best available in market).
150. See id. (fairness opinion does not certify that management's offer is best or highest
available); infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text (favorable opinion on fairness obligates
neither investment banker issuing opinion or management group making offer that management's
offer to minority shareholders is best available in market).
151. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-22 (Del. 1971) (business judgment
rule generally governs parent company's fiduciary duty to subsidiary company shareholders); in-
fra notes 191-92 and accompanying text (business judgment rule permits management great deal
of discretion).
152. See Massaro v. Vernitron Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1068, 1080 (D. Mass. 1983) (Delaware
corporate law evaluates claims involving corporate fiduciary conduct under business judgment
standard); Chazen, supra note 38, at 1453 (business judgment rule generally governs corporate
fiduciary's response to acquisition proposals).
153. See Massaro v. Vernitron, 559 F. Supp. 1068, 1080 (D. Mass. 1983) (court will not
disturb corporate fiduciary's business judgment so long as fiduciary's corporate decisions may
have rational business purposes).
154. See Chazen, supra note 38, at 1453-54 (investment banker would probably not even
issue opinion that specific offer is highest or best available).
155. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 19, col. 3 (fairness opinion provides powerful legal
support for judgment of corporate fiduciaries).
156. See Chazen, supra note 38, at 1453-54 (board of directors does not require opinion
on financial fairness that utilizes standard stricter than business judgment standard); infra text
accompanying note 157 (court will judge corporate fiduciary's conduct by business judgment
rule which presumes that fiduciary acts in good faith).
157. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-22 (Del. 1971) (court will not inter-
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favorable opinion on fairness provides some protection for minority
shareholders by assuring that a given offer is not unreasonably low in relation
to a company's other sale opportunities, shareholders may incorrectly perceive
an investment banker's opinion on fairness to mean that management's offer-
ing price for minority shares is equivalent to that which a third party would
offer in an arms-length negotiation. 5 ' SEC rule 13e-3's disclosure of whether
the company has obtained a fairness opinion, therefore, may be of greater
benefit to management in establishing the fairness of a buyout transaction
than to shareholders in assuring that minority shareholders receive fair value
during buyout transactions. 9
A recently attempted buyout transaction illustrates the utility of fairness
opinions in assuring that minority shareholders receive a value equivalent to
market values in management buyout transactions.1 0 In June of 1983, Stokley-
Van Camp, Inc. (Stokely) sought shareholder approval for a management
buyout of all of Stokely's publicly held shares."' Stokely had previously ob-
tained a fairness opinion from an investment banking firm which stated that
management's 55 dollar offer to Stokely's shareholders was fair from a finan-
cial point of view."" Moreover, Stokely's nonmanagement directors recom-
mended the transaction to the entire board of directors who in turn concluded
that the buyout transaction was fair and attractive to Stokely's shareholders." 3
Four weeks after Stokely's 55 dollar offer, however, Pillsbury Company of-
fered 62 dollar per share for Stokely's outstanding shares."61 Still three weeks
after Pillsbury's offer, Quaker Oats Co. tendered at 77 dollar per share for
all outstanding shares and was successful in acquiring Stokely."' Here, Stokely's
shareholders were lucky.66 The Stokely management group only controlled
fere with fiduciary's business conduct under business judgment rule absent showing of gross and
palpable overreaching).
158. See SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 442 F. Supp. 477, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (shareholder
placing weight on fairness opinion risks danger of believing that management's offer is actually
fair while fairness opinion is in fact of little value in assessing fairness of management's offer);
Longstreth, supra note 2, at 20, col. 2 (fairness opinion will heavily influence shareholders into
believing transaction is fair without assuring that management's offer is actually fair).
159. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 20, col. 2 (SEC Rule 13e-3 disclosures are more effec-
tive in protecting management than in assuring fairness for minority shareholders).
160. See id. at 19, col. 3 (range of fairness is too great for fairness opinions to be of value
in determining fair price for minority shares); infra text accompanying notes 162-69 (market ex-
ceeded management's offer by over 40% despite fact that investment banker had determined
that management's offer was fair to minority shareholders).
161. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. I (Stokely's management intended to finance
cash buyout transaction by borrowing against Stokely's assets).
162. See id.; supra notes 148 & 158 and accompanying text (fairness opinion may give powerful
support to fairness of management's offer).
163. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. 1 (special committee of nonmanagement direc-
tors investigated fairness of management's offer); Hill & Williams, supra note 5, at 6, col. 3
(Stokely's Chairman still maintains that Stokely's offer to public shareholders was fair).
164. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. I (Pillsbury's offer was a cash tender offer
for all of Stokely's outstanding shares).
165. Id.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 167-69 (Stokely's shareholders were able to profit
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22 percent of Stokely's shares and thus had to conduct a tender offer for
corporate control as the first stage of a two-step merger transaction.1 67 Had
the Stokely management group controlled a larger percentage of Stokely's
outstanding shares prior to the attempted buyout transaction, the manage-
ment group could have directly conducted a one-step merger transaction to
freezeout Stokely's minority shareholders. 6 " If the Stokely management group
had been able to conduct a one-step merger, however, Stokely's public
shareholders would never have benefitted from Pillsbury's and Quaker Oats'
subsequent offer.' 69
In responding to the danger of management groups freezing out minority
shareholders at prices substantially below those which the market would pay
for minority shareholder interests, some commentators have advocated a ban
on management buyout transactions. 7 ' Such a position is clearly an
overreaction.'7 ' Evidence indicates that buyouts produce gains that can benefit
all participants in a buyout transaction.' Particularly in the case of solid,
slow growing companies with little debt and dedicated management teams,
going private may result in increased productivity and more efficient capital
utilization." 3 Moreover, a recent study of 72 buyout transactions that occur-
red between 1973 and 1980 indicates that shareholders involved in freezeout
transactions received a premium above market prices that was on average
equivalent to the premiums which shareholders received in armslength tender
offers during the same period."" The fear of management groups exploiting
from subsequent bids because Stokely's management did not own a controlling interest prior
to buyout transaction).
167. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. I (management's 22% holding was not suffi-
cient to block third party bidders); supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (management groups
may conduct two-step merger procedure when management does not possess controlling block
of corporate shares prior to buyout transaction).
168. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. 1 (Stokely's shareholders profited from fact
that Stokely's management did not own enough of Stokely's shares to prevent third parties from
bidding for Stokely's publicly held shares).
169. See id. (Longstreth questions meaning of fairness when marketplace exceeds manage-
ment's fair offer by over 40%).
170. See Brudney, supra note 3, at 1098 (categorical prohibition of going private transac-
tions is most effective way of ensuring public shareholders receive fair value); Longstreth, supra
note 2, at 21, col. 2 (some have argued for prohibiting management buyouts).
171. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (buyout transactions produce real gains
which can benefit all parties to transaction).
172. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (synergistic gains of buyout transaction
accrue to all interested parties).
173. See Ross, supra note 6, at 74, col. 2 (companies with little debt, predictable cash flows,
and capable management teams make excellent buyout candidates); Wantuck, supra note 1, at
60 (companies with dedicated management, small inventories, and little debt are safer buyout
candidates); Hill & Williams, supra note 5, at 6, col. 2 (companies become leaner following buyout
transactions resulting in more efficient capital allocation); De Angelo & De Angelo, supra note
7, at D-2, col. 3 (improved incentives for managers under private ownership creates significant
productivity gains).
174. See De Angelo & De Angelo, supra note 7, at D-2, col. 2 (study examined 72 leveraged
buyout proposals on American and New York Stock Exchanges).
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minority shareholders in buyout transactions appears to have been
unwarranted.'
Commentators nonetheless have proposed procedures for enlarging the
protections available to minority shareholders in management buyout
transactions. 7 The most frequently proposed procedure for protecting minority
shareholders during management buyouts is the court imposition of a third-
party sale standard to govern the fairness of buyout transactions.'77 Under
a third-party sale value standard, an acquisition of corporate shares is unfair
unless the value shareholders receive for the acquired company's shares is within
the range of prices that the acquired company's shareholders might have
received had an unaffiliated buyer purchased the entire company in an arms-
length negotiation. 78 The difficulty of imposing a third-party sale value stan-
dard, however, is discerning the value that an unaffiliated shareholder might
pay for the purchase of the entire company in question.'7 9 One commentator,
for instance, has suggested that courts could implement a third-party sale value
standard by prohibiting management groups owning a controlling block of
corporate shares prior to a buyout transaction from freezing out minority
shareholders unless the management group allows third parties to bid for the
minority's shares.' 0 The management group would then have to match the
highest third-party bid for the minority's shares or sell-out to the highest bid-
der before management could execute a buyout transaction.'' Such a third-
party sale standard, however, misunderstands the value of corporate shares
to differing purchasers in acquisition transactions.8 2 Because control of a public
175. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (evidence indicates that buyouts produce
gains for public shareholders without presenting great risk of exploiting minority shareholders);
infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (public exposure will deter companies from engaging
in exploitive buyouts).
176. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 21, col. 2 (law should require managers to permit
outside parties to bid for corporate shares before conducting buyout transaction); Chazen, supra
note 38, at 1446-61 (Chazen advocates formation of committee to negotiate for minority shareholders
during management buyout transactions); text accompanying notes 177-79 (discussion of third-
party sale standard for protection of minority shareholders).
177. See Chazen, supra note 38, at 1439 (acquisition is unfair unless price shareholders receive
for shares is within range of prices shareholders would have received had an unaffiliated buyer
purchased entire company); Longstreth, supra note 2, at 21, col. 2 (law should require manage-
ment to allow all potential buyers to bid for company before conducting buyout transactions).
178. See supra note 177 (critics contend that minority shareholders should receive in manage-
ment buyouts value that unaffiliated purchaser would pay for corporate shares).
179. See Umbriac v. Kaiser, 467 F. Supp. 548, 554, 554 n.5 (D. Nev. 1979) (lack of firm
offers renders theoretical evidence of value speculative and impractical); Berman v. Gerber Prod.
Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1317-18 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (overtures for possible purchases are distinct
from definite offers); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 55 (D.N.J. 1974) (court con-
siders identity of corporate acquirers significant in assessing fairness of control transaction).
180. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 21, col. 2-3 (management must provide potential bid-
ders time to investigate company and opportunity to make competing bids).
181. See id. at 19, col. 4 to 20, col. 1 (management buyout proceeds from management's
initial decision that selling company is in interest of shareholders).
182. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (controlling shareholders value minority
shares very differently from purchaser buying entire company).
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corporation commands a premium over market prices,183 a public company's
minority shares are not as valuable to investors as the company's shares which
constitute a controlling block.I84 A standard of fairness which requires a con-
trolling shareholder to match the highest value that minority shareholders would
receive were a third party purchasing the entire company does not account
for the fact that the controlling shareholder already owns the more valuable
controlling shares.'85 A third party purchaser would therefore be willing to
pay more for the minority's shares in purchasing the entire company than
would a controlling shareholder in purchasing just the minority's shares because
the third party would be purchasing a mixture of control and noncontrol shares
while the controlling shareholder would be purchasing only noncontrol
shares. 8 6 It would thus be unfair for courts to require controlling shareholders
in purchasing minority shares to match the offer that a third party would
pay for the minority's shares in purchasing the entirey company.,87
State courts, however, are in a position to better assure fairness for minority
shareholders in management buyout transactions by employing a stricter stan-
dard to test the fairness of buyout transactions. 88 The business judgment
standard,'8 9 which generally governs corporate fiduciary conduct, is too per-
missive a standard with which to test the fairness of buyout transactions. 98
Under the business judgment standard, a court presumes that corporate
fiduciaries act in good faith in displacing minority shareholders during manage-
ment buyout transactions. 9 ' Moreover, the business judgment standard places
183. See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962) (control block
of corporate shares commands premium price); Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684,
685, 397 N.E.2d 387, 388, 421 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (1979) (control shares commatld premium price
which reflects privilege of directly influencing corporate affairs).
184. See Chazen, supra note 38, at 1468 (controlling shares of corporate stock are more
valuable than noncontrol shares).
185. See id. (discussing value of corporate shares to different buyers). In determining the
value that a controlling shareholder would pay for the company's publicly held shares, Chazen
asserts that a controlling shareholder would pay less share than an outside purchaser would pay
per share in buying the entire company because the controlling shareholder is buying less valuable
noncontrol shares while the outside purchaser is buying a mixture of control and noncontrol
shares. Id.
186. See id. (outside purchaser must pay premium to purchase corporation that has controlling
shareholder).
187. See id. (controlling shareholders will pay less per share for company's minority shares
than outside purchaser would pay per share for all of company's shares).
188. See Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 153 (D. Del. 1975)
(court must determine which standard to employ for purpose of testing propriety of mergers).
189. See Massaro v. Vernitron Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1068, 1080 (D. Mass. 1983) (business
judgment standard presumes that corporate fiduciaries exercise good faith in making business
decisions with which courts will not interfere in absence of fraud, bad faith, or gross overreaching).
190. See id. (Delaware courts test corporate fiduciary conduct under business judgment stan-
dard); infra text accompanying note 203 (management buyout transactions warrant stricter stan-
dard of judicial scrutiny because of inherent potential for self-dealing).
191. See Massaro v. Vernitron Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1068, 1080 (D. Mass. 1983) (court will




the burden of persuasion on a plaintiff shareholder challenging a buyout trans-
action to establish a showing of bad faith, fraud, or palpable overreaching
before a court will interfere with the transaction. 192 Plaintiff shareholders,
however, may lack the financial or informational resources necessary to over-
come the difficult burden of the business judgment rule by establishing a show-
ing of bad faith, fraud, or palpable overreaching on the part of corporate
fiduciaries. 93 Courts, therefore, should test the fairness of management buyout
transactions under a standard stricter than that of the business judgment rule. 194
The standard of intrinsic fairness, for instance, would provide for greater pro-
tection for minority shareholders in management buyouts by shifting the burden
of persuasion to the proponents of a buyout transaction to establish the fairness
of the transaction in question and by requiring courts to scrutinize carefully
fiduciary conduct to assure fairness for minority shareholders. 95
State courts, however, have been reluctant to apply the intrinsic fairness
standard to test the fairness of corporate transactions. " 6 The State of Delaware,
moreover, requires a showing of domination and control and a showing of
self-dealing to invoke the intrinsic fairness test." 7 Although the factor of
domination and control requires only a showing of a parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship and thus applies to one and two-step mergers,198 Delaware courts will
only find that self-dealing has occurred when the dominant party in a transac-
tion receives value to the detriment of minority shareholders. 9 9 Delaware courts
may therefore engage in lengthy financial analysis to determine whether the
dominant party in a transaction receives value to the exclusion of or detri-
ment to minority shareholders. 200 This judicial process of financial examina-
192. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-22 (Del. 1971) (burden of proof
remains with plaintiff under business judgment standard).
193. See Puma v. Marriot, 283 A.2d 693, 695-96 (Del. Ch. 1971) (court requires that plain-
tiff present evidence of fraud to overcome burden of business judgment rule).
194. See Massaro v. Vernitron Cop., 559 F. Supp. 1068, 1080 (D. Mass. 1983) (plaintiff
must show fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching, or abuse of discretion on part of corporate fiduciary
to overcome burden of business judgment rule); infra text accompanying notes 203-05 (tempta-
tion toward self-dealing in management buyout transactions warrants judicial imposition of stan-
dard stricter than business judgment standard).
195. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-22 (Del. 1971) (intrinsic fairness
standard requires high degree of fairness and shift in burden of proof).
196. See Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 122-23 (Del. Ch. 1971) (court refuses to
invoke standard of intrinsic fairness in absence of plaintiff 's showing of control and domination
on part of corporate fiduciary); infra text accompanying notes 197-200 (Delaware courts require
plaintiffs to prove elements of domination and control before invoking standard of intrinsic fairness).
197. See Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 289 A.2d 119, 122-23 (Del. Ch. 1971) (domination and
control imply direction of corporate conduct to serve purposes of corporation or person in control).
198. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430-31 (Del. Ch. 1968)
(intrinsic fairness standard is appropriate to test fiduciary conduct in parent-subsidiary mergers);
supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text (one and two-step merger techniques involve parent-
subsidiary relationships).
199. See Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 147-51 (D. Del.
1975) (dominant party must receive something to exclusion of minority shareholders in order
to establish self-dealing).
200. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968)
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tion and valuation, however, does not necessarily produce accurate appraisals 201
and can serve as an impediment to the invocation of the intrinsic fairness stan-
dard in Delaware actions.2"2 Since buyout transactions present a clear poten-
tial for self dealing, state courts should be willing to invoke the intrinsic fairness
standard without financial proof of self-dealing to the detriment of minority
shareholders. 20 3 The invocation of the intrinsic fairness standard could then
serve as a deterrent to management groups contemplating exploitive buyout
transactions for fear that the management insiders would be unable to sustain
the burden of proving the fairness of the buyout transaction under careful
judicial scrutiny.204 The business judgment standard, by comparison, provides
management groups contemplating a buyout transaction far greater latitude
in determining the value that minority shareholders will receive for displaced
shares in buyout transactions.
20 5
The single greatest deterrent to unfair treatment of minority shareholders
in buyout transactions, however, is likely to be public exposure. 26 The literature
that documents alleged buyout abuses does much to mitigate the danger of
shareholder injustice in buyout transactions. 20 7 These articles presumably deter
managers from contemplating inequitable buyouts for fear of personal and
(court insists on examining extensive financial information to determine fairness of merger
transaction).
201. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (criticism of court's ability to conduct
accurate valuations in appraisal proceedings).
202. See Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 122-23 (Del. Ch. 1971) (plaintiff unable
to prove that financial transactions between corporate fiduciaries constituted self-dealing to detri-
ment of corporate shareholders); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-22 (Del. 1971)
(court refused to invoke intrinsic fairness standard because plaintiff shareholders could not prove
that dividend payments which parent company extracted from subsidiary company were unfair
or otherwise fraudulent).
203. See Longstreth, supra note 2, at 15, col. 3 (management acts on both sides of buyout
transaction in pursuit of management's own self-interest); supra notes 18-20 and accompanying
text (management's participation on both sides of sale and repurchase transaction presents clear
case of fiduciary self-dealing).
204. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952) (court will carefully
scrutinize fiduciary's attempt to establish entire fairness of merger transaction under intrinsic
fairness standard).
205. See Massaro v. Vernitron Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1068, 1080 (D. Mass. 1983) (court will
not disturb judgment of corporate fiduciary under business judgment standard so long as court
can attribute some rational business purpose to fiduciary's decisions).
206. See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 14, at D-4 (unfair buyout transactions will erode in-
vestor confidence in markets and dampen interest in future public financing); Thomas, supra
note 141, at D-2, coi.4 (criticizing management's informational advantage in buyout transaction);
Getting Hot, supra note 1, at 86 (some see buyout as classic insider technique for acquiring com-
panies at favorable prices); infra text accompanying notes 207-10 (companies will fear judicial
attention following exploitive buyout transactions).
207. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981) (potential for cor-
porate and personal liability does not end after inequitable transaction is completed), rev'd on
other grounds, 457 A.2d 703 (Del. 1983); Longstreth, supra note 2, at 21, col. 1-3 (stating that
SEC will more closely scrutinize buyout transactions in future); supra text accompanying notes
160-69 (public documentation of potentially exploitive buyout).
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corporate liability.208 Where shareholders have already sustained losses during
completed buyout transactions, the awarding of rescissory damages in lieu
of actual recission would nonetheless deter other management groups con-
templating similar schemes of enrichment. 20 9 Furthermore, state courts should
show no reluctance in holding corporate officers and boards of directors per-
sonally liable for taking part in exploitive buyouts. ° Corporate fiduciaries
must not perceive the separation of ownership from management in public
companies as an opportunity to expropriate assets and earnings which in fact
belong to the shareholders. 21' Perhaps in response to the potential for per-
sonal and corporate liability, however, management buyouts have not yet
proven to be a serious danger to the interests of public shareholders. 21 2 To
the extent that present and future legal safeguards are sufficient to protect
public shareholders in buyout transactions, investors, managers, and the capital
markets may continue to benefit from management buyout transactions.
2 3
STUART ROBIN KAPLAN
208. See Ross, supra note 6, it 78 (real risk to persons involved in buyout transactions is
credibility of buyout procedure).
209. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981) (court awards recissory
damages in place of unraveling unfair merger), rev'd on other grounds, 457 A.2d 703 (Del. 1983).
210. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (most states will provide equitable and
monetary relief to shareholders when appraisal remedy is insufficient to protect shareholder interests).
211. See A. Bum. & G. Mwrs, supra note 16, at 196-98 (managers are mere agents of cor-
poration which in fact belongs to shareholders).
212. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (premiums shareholders received in freezeout
transactions were equivalent to premiums that shareholders received in public tender offers dur-
ing same period of time).
213. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (management buyout transactions can
produce gains sufficiently large to benefit all participants in buyout process). •
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